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William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987),Google Scholar
See M. B. Ahern, The Problem of Evil (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1971), p. ix.Google Scholar
See Alvin Plantinga’s, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980).Google Scholar
For a helpful discussion of this doctrine see Plantinga’s Does God Have a Nature? pp. 95–110.Google Scholar
For a helpful discussion of this doctrine see Plantinga’s Does God Have a Nature? pp. 95–110. Cf. P. T. Geach, Providence and Evil (Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 8f, andGoogle Scholar
Anthony Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 91f.Google Scholar
W. V. Quine, Methods of Logic (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1950), p. 3.Google Scholar
Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 171. In this context, Plantinga addresses the ‘omnipotence paradox’ introduced by J. L. Mackie in ‘Evil and Omnipotence,’ p. 210. The paradox is started by the question, Can God make things he cannot then control? If we say ‘Yes,’ then once he has made them he is not omnipotent. If we say ‘No,’ then we are admitting that there are things that God cannot do. Richard La Croix argues that it is a concept that is impossible to define, in ‘The Impossibility of Defining Omnipotence,’ Philosophical Studies, Vol. 32 (1977), pp. 181–190.Google Scholar
See S. Morris Engel, With Good Reason (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976), p. 145.Google Scholar
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Here, I am assuming that the omniscient being is within time even though he might be eternal. A very different rendering would be required if the theist were to hold that God is omniscient and atemporally eternal. See Eleanore Stump’s and Norman Kretzmann’s article, ‘Eternity’, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 8 (August, 1981), pp. 429–458.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
This particular locution is attributed to Elizabeth Anscombe by Anthony Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 48, n. 1. The counterexample is supplied by Norman Kretzmann.Google Scholar
J. R. Lucas, The Freedom of the Will (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reformed theologians, John Murray and Ned B. Stonehouse, and apologist Cornelius Van Til argued that there is such a radical difference, challenging Gordon H. Clark on the matter of God’s incomprehensibility at his ordination examination. See Fred H. Klooster, The Incomprehensibility of God in the Orthodox Presbyterian Conflict (Franeker: T. Wever, 1951).Google Scholar
Cf., John H. Frame, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1987), pp. 21–40.Google Scholar
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René Descartes held to an absolute omnipotence doctrine such that God is somehow supralogical and hence can, ‘if he wants,’ nullify or set aside the canons of logic and make true a contradictory proposition or do something that would be contradictory for him to do. Actually, his position was ambiguous. His writings may be interpreted as supporting either universal or limited possibilism. The former is the view that Descartes’ ‘eternal truths,’ e.g., the truths of logic, mathematics, etc., are not necessary truths. The latter position by contrast affirms that eternal truths are necessary, but they owe their necessity to divine decree. See Alvin Plantinga’s, Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), pp. 95–110.Google Scholar
Nelson Pike, ‘Divine Foreknowledge, Human Freedom and Possible Worlds,’ The Philosophical Review, Vol. 86, No. 2 (April, 1977), p. 209. In Divine Nature and Human Language (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), William Alston argues that God does not have beliefs, pp. 178–193CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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See Peter van Inwagen’s Material Beings (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), for an interesting account of such things as trees, clouds, and puppy dogs’ tails.Google Scholar
Nelson Pike, God and Timelessness (New York: Schocken, 1970), pp. 121–129, cf., Zagzebski’s The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, pp. 43f., for other criticisms of this view of God’s eternity.Google Scholar
William Hasker, ‘Response to Thomas Flint,’ Philosophical Studies, 60, (1990), p. 120. See this article for an elegant argument against middle knowledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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See Charles Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. vii, 43, 83, 94. The theist, of course, can benefit from some of Hartshorne’s insights, without buying into process theology.Google Scholar
Bruce Reichenbach, ‘Evil and a Reformed View of God,’ International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 24 (1988), pp. 67–85, particularly pp. 70–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Representing the Western tradition, Henry Mansel and Emil Brunner fall into this camp. Both held to the unknowability of God and so also its corollary the unknowability of his goodness. See Emil Brunner’s God and Man (London: SCM Press, 1936), pp. 59, 60, 76–84.Google Scholar
Cf. G. Stanley Kane, ‘The Concept of Divine Goodness and the Problem of Evil,’ Religious Studies, Vol. II, No. 1 (March, 1975), 49–71. Kane includes Karl Barth, see Barth’s Church Dogmatics, II. 1, pp. 188,189; II. 2, pp. 631–636 (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1936). Barth also clearly affirms God’s knowability, see Church Dogmatics II. 2, pp 4f., 147ff., 156f., 158ff.CrossRe

Morris Engel With Good Reason